On the intention-behaviour discrepancy. Empirical evidence from succession on farms in Finland. by Väre, Minna et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Minna Väre and Christoph Weiss and Kyösti Pietola
On the intention-behaviour discrepancy. Empirical evidence from succession
on farms in Finland.
Working Paper
Original Citation:
Väre, Minna and Weiss, Christoph and Pietola, Kyösti (2005) On the intention-behaviour
discrepancy. Empirical evidence from succession on farms in Finland. Discussion Papers SFB
International Tax Coordination, 3. SFB International Tax Coordination, WU Vienna University of
Economics and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/1460/
Available in ePubWU: September 2005
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/

 2 
On the Intention-Behaviour Discrepancy: 
Empirical Evidence From Succession on Farms in Finland 
Minna Väre+), Christoph R. Weiss++) and Kyösti Pietola+) 
 
+)Agrifood Research Finland  
MTT Economic Research 
Luutnantintie 13, FIN-00410 Helsinki, Finland 
minna.vare@mtt.fi 
kyosti.pietola@mtt.fi 
 
++)Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration 
Department of Economics  
Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria 
cweiss@wu-wien.ac.at 
   
Abstract: This study examines and compares farmers’ succession plans and actual succession 
behaviour and finds that the farm operator’s age and regional variables influence both. We 
also find a discrepancy between intention and actual behaviour which is significantly related 
to the farm operator’s age. Whereas the likelihood of planned succession is overestimated 
significantly for younger farm operators, the opposite is observed once the farm operator’s 
age exceeds 65 years. Therefore, stated plans have only a negligible value in predicting the 
observed behaviour and farm operator’s statements on the timing of succession may not pro-
vide enough information on the grounds of designing structural policies in agriculture.  
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1. Introduction 
The circumstances of succession are of great importance not only for the family members 
directly involved but also for the survival and success of family farms in the long run, the 
appearance of rural areas, and the structure of the farm sector (Gale, 1993). Given the impor-
tance of (family) succession for family firm survival (e.g. Kimhi, 1997), surprisingly little 
theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to this issue in agricultural economics. The 
existing literature is dominated by social scientists and anthropologists (Khera, 1973; Erring-
ton, 1993; Blanc and Perrier-Cornet, 1993). Only during the last decade, agricultural econo-
mists have started to investigate family succession more intensively (Kimhi, 1994). 
Two different empirical approaches can be distinguished in this literature. The first group of 
studies analyses (actual) succession ex-post by investigating panel data on farm households. 
Information on the farm operator’s age in different time periods is used to identify farm suc-
cessions. If the age of the farm operator between period t and t + x increases by less than x 
years (or more than x years), one concludes that the person operating the farm has changed. 
This approach has been used successfully in Kimhi (1994) and Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000).1 
The second and more common approach is to investigate future succession plans of farm op-
erators ex-ante on the basis of a farm survey. The respondents are asked about the probability 
and timing of family succession and whether a farm successor is already determined. Exam-
ples of studies following this approach include Kimhi and Lopez (1999), Kimhi and Nachlieli 
(2001), Glauben et al. (2002) and Mishra et al. (2004). Sharma et al., (2003) investigate suc-
cession in family firms empirically by collecting data on both, firms that had undergone suc-
                                                 
1  Pietola, Väre and Lansink (2003) follow a different empirical approach. Using data from the Farmers’ 
Social Insurance Institution has allowed them to study actual succession on the basis of more reliable in-
formation. 
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cession from one family member to another in the five years prior to the survey as well as 
those that anticipate such an event in the ensuing five years.  
Clearly, each of the two approaches has its specific advantages and disadvantages. Farm sur-
veys typically provide more detailed information on the motives of specific behaviour as the 
design of the survey and the questions to be asked can be particularly focused on the issue to 
be analysed. Similarly, surveys typically allow choosing the group of individuals to be sur-
veyed directly and to control the impact of exogenous factors. On the other hand, authors 
from different fields of economics (and, in particular, from economic psychology and market-
ing) have challenged the usefulness of intention measures (such as succession plans) as a pre-
dictor for actual behaviour.2 Foxall (1983), for example, argues that a high intention-
behaviour correspondence should be expected only under strictly limited (and unrealistic) 
conditions.3  
A discrepancy between intention and actual behaviour might exist for a number of reasons. 
First, individual preferences might change over time because both the economic environment 
and the family situation have changed (Ajzen, 1985). New information becomes available, the 
                                                 
2  Mueller (1957), Tobin (1959) and Theil and Kosobud (1968) are early examples of empirical studies on 
the relationship between plans and actual behaviour. In agricultural economics too, there is some empiri-
cal evidence that the difference between planned and realised investments can be large (Honkanen, 1983; 
Kuhmonen, 1995). Focusing on farm succession, Glauben et al. (2002) suggest an inconsistency in farm 
operator’s succession plans over time. However, their results are based on cross-sectional data only and 
thus cannot account for actual behaviour. 
 
3  The author notes that there must be no impediment to the voluntary performance of the action and that the 
individual’s situation must remain stable from the time of the measurement throughout the performance 
of the behaviour. This ceteris-paribus condition will also be relevant in interpreting the results from our 
empirical analysis. 
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financial situation of the farm changes, the potential successor receives an attractive job offer 
in the non-farm business, and so forth. 
Secondly, the survey design, as well as the quality of the responses, is often inappropriate. In 
some of the surveys used, information on succession plans is only a by-product of question-
naires focusing on different issues. Furthermore, individuals certainly spend a lot of time and 
effort in making the right succession decisions but may only devote little time responding to a 
survey. This point is emphasised in the revealed preference literature: people display their true 
preferences in what they do, not what they say. Individuals might also feel obliged to answer 
the question about intentions even though they have not yet made specific plans (Bagozzi and 
Yi, 1989). Ill- formed intentions are held with low confidence, will change quickly over time 
and will only have a weak impact on behaviour.  
Thirdly, actual succession decisions in family firms involve actions of different family mem-
bers (Kimhi, 1997), whereas surveys  typically are addressed to one individual only. Surveys 
often consider the farm operator's point of view without paying enough attention to the chil-
dren’s opinion. The farm operator's plans, however, do not always materialise as the desig-
nated successor may decide to develop a career in the non-farm business, for example.  
A final reason for an intention – behaviour discrepancy is intertemporal inconsistency in ind i-
viduals’ preferences and behaviour. According to Horowitz (1992), ‘intertemporal consis-
tency’ means that the activity an individual now plans to carry out in the future are the activi-
ties that the individual actually carries out when the future arrives’ (p. 171). The phenomenon 
of intertemporal consistency (or inconsistency) was introduced as a characteristic of the utility 
function by Strotz (1956) and, since then, repeatedly arises in models of marketing and con-
sumption behaviour and of monetary or fiscal policy. Empirical evidence from experimental 
studies suggests that individuals do not act in a consistent way.  
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Such discrepancies between intention and actual behaviour are of concern to economists for 
two reasons. First, if these differences appear in a non-systematic (random) fashion, the pre-
dictive validity (reliability) of intention measures is reduced due to a random measurement 
error. Secondly, and maybe more important ly, if the probability of the farm operator's succes-
sion plans to come true are related to farm and family characteristics (such as farm size, the 
farm operator’s age, etc.), the results of econometric studies based on farm surveys would be 
biased. As the farm operator’s age increases, new information about his health status emerges 
which could motivate him to revise his original plans. Similar, the potential farm successor 
might be less interested in taking over smaller and less profitable farms, which would suggest 
a systematic relationship between farm size and the intention–behaviour discrepancy. Fur-
thermore, economic psychologists frequently hypothesise that an individual’s discount rate is 
not constant over time but varies inversely with the length of the time to be waited. The rela-
tive marginal price of waiting for rewards appears to decline as the time necessary to wait 
increases. This would suggest farm operators’ succession plans to be systematically biased.4 It 
is further suggested, that the rate of discount might vary inversely with the size of the reward 
for which the individual must wait (people getting the big decisions right). Again, this would 
imply that the actions of individuals are not consistent over time and succession plans and 
actual behaviour are at variance. 
The goal of this study is to investigate succession considerations empirically by focusing on 
both actual succession behaviour and subjective succession plans. We also compare intentions 
and behaviour, and investigate whether the difference between them is systematically related 
                                                 
4  Thaler and Sherfin (1981) illustrate time inconsistency with a customer, who plans to go on diet on Janu-
ary 1, but when January 1 arrives, postpones the beginning of the diet. It is often suggested that the differ-
ence between today and tomorrow will seem greater than the difference between a year from now and a 
year plus one day. 
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to farm and family characteristics.5 If this discrepancy is large and non-random, then the value 
of farm succession surveys for agricultural policy-making is diminished. Section 2 briefly 
describes the data and the estimation method. Section 3 reports the estimation results and sec-
tion 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Estimation Method 
The farm data are taken from the Finnish Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). This 
network collects annually information on financial characteristics on roughly 900 farms. Ac-
countancy data are supplemented by annual surveys on farm operator’s (ex-ante) succession 
plans, which are carried out on the FADN farms since 1996. Among other things, the ques-
tionnaire includes information on farmers’ plans for the following five years. The question 
posed here is: ‘If you are not going to continue farming on the farm by yourself, what is going 
to happen?’ One of the nine response options is: ‘the farm will be handed down within the 
farm family’. We define a dummy variable for planned succession (PS), which is set equal to 
1 if this option is chosen by the respondent, and is zero otherwise. 
We also confront the attitudes and intentions of individuals with the record of their subse-
quent behaviour. Information on actual succession (AS) is obtained ex-post by applying an 
approach similar to Kimhi (1994) and Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000). If the age of the farm op-
erator in two succeeding years increases by less (or more) than one year, we conclude that the 
person operating the farm has changed. In this case, we set the dummy variable AS equal to 1. 
                                                 
5  It is not the intention of this study to empirically test the different explanations for an intention–behaviour 
discrepancy (should one exist) based on family’s commitment or desires like e.g. in Sharma et al., (2003). 
This would go far beyond the scope of this paper and could not be done without additional experimental 
evidence. 
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A balanced panel of 348 farms is available for the period of 1996-2001.6 The farm data in-
clude detailed information on the farm characteristics and the financial situation of the farm. 
Since the primary objective of the supplementing survey was not to study succession, little 
information on variables that are considered important for investigating this issue econometri-
cally is available. In particular, no information on children and other family members living 
on the farm is to hand. Furthermore, information on the specific motivation of farm operators 
with respect to succession is not accessible. The planned and actual succession behaviour of 
the 348 farms is reported in Table 1.  
Table 1. Actual and planned succession behaviour between 1996 and 2001. 
   Actual Succession 
(AS) 
 
   0 1 Total 
0 279 11 290 Planned 
Succession (PS) 1 40 18 58 
  Total 319 29 348 
 
Remarks: An c2-test rejects the assumption of independence of the two variables at the 99% level. Planned suc-
cession refers to the plans reported in 1996 for the period 1996 to 2001. 
From the 348 farm households interviewed in 1996, the majority (290 or 83%) did not plan to 
transfer the farm within the following five years. Fifty-eight respondents (17%) indicated the 
                                                 
6  The FADN data include 511 farms  on which survey data on farm succession is available both in 1996 and 
in 1997. Of these farms, 366 continued farm profitability accountancy to the year 2001 whereas 145 dis-
appeared from the data set between 1998 and 2001. Those 145 farms do not differ substantially from 
those remaining in the farm profitability accountancy over the whole study period 1996-2001 (see Ap-
pendix 1). Unfortunately, we do not have more specific information on the reasons for farms’ exit from 
the FADN. We further eliminated 18 observations where the farm operator reports plans to sell or rent out 
the farm to a non-family member, reforest the fields or has some “other plans” for the following five 
years. 
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intention to hand over the farm to a successor. As Table 1 suggests, not all of these succession 
plans did actually materialise. Looking at actual farm succession, we find that only a third of 
those farms that planned succession did hand over the farm to a successor within the follow-
ing five years (18 out of 58 farms). In the majority of cases (40 farms) the planned succession 
did not take place. We call this a ‘type two-error’ of succession planning. On the other hand, 
from those 290 farms planning not to hand over the farm in the following five years, the ma-
jority (279 farms  or 96%) actually comply with this plan. Unplanned succession took place in 
11 farms. These 11 cases are considered ‘type one errors’ of succession planning. 
The econometric analysis of succession plans and actual succession behaviour will be carried 
out in two steps. First, we estimate probit models on the binary variables AS and PS and com-
pare results. Secondly, we define a new variable measuring the intention–behaviour discrep-
ancy (DS) and test, whether the likelihood of a discrepancy to occur is related to specific 
characteristics of the farm and the farm household. 
ï
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The choice of exogenous variables is determined by earlier literature and data availability. 
 
3. Results 
First, single equation probit models were estimated separately for planned and actual succes-
sion. Parameter estimates are shown in Table 2. The estimated models are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level or better, as measured by the likelihood ratio test. 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of the single equation probit models (t-values in parentheses). 
 
 
Planned Succession 
PS 
Actual Succession 
AS 
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
     
Constant  -5.624 (-7.66) 3.418 (1.16) 
Farmer’s age (AGEF) 0.998 (6.99) -0.399 (-2.94) 
Farmer’s age squared (AGEF2)   0.005 (3.75) 
Spouse’s age (AGES) 0.001 (0.04) 0.009 (0.88) 
Arable land area (LAND) -0.002 (-0.57) 0.007 (1.16) 
Farm Income (INC) 0.057 (0.86) 0.029 (0.32) 
Livestock and dairy farm (LDF) 0.254 (0.91) 0.869 (1.83) 
North (NORTH) -0.147 (-0.70) 0.695 (2.16) 
Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) 0.257 (0.85) -0.180 (-0.33) 
Farm family's 'working hours (HOURS ) -0.067 (-0.91) -0.012 (-1.07) 
     
Log- likelihood -114.245 -51.611 
Restricted log- likelihood -156.780 -99.818 
Likelihood ratio test (DF) 85.099 (8) 96.416 (9) 
% Correct predictions 84.19 95.11 
% Correct predictions 1 (0) 24.14 (96.20) 51.72 (99.05) 
Remarks: DF refers to the degrees of freedom. 
 
The estimated probit model on succession plans correctly cla ssifies 84.2% of the cases. 
Whereas 96.2% of farms which do not plan succession (PS = 0) are correctly predicted, the 
percentage of correctly classified observations where the farm operator plans to hand over the 
farm (PS = 1) is substantially lower with 24.1%. The predictive power of the probit model on 
actual successions is somewhat higher. The empirical model correctly classifies 95.1% of all 
observation, 99.1% of farms with no succession (AS = 0) and 51.7% of farms with succession 
(AS = 1) are correctly classified.  
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The results in Table 2 suggest that the farm operator’s age (AGEF) is the most important ex-
planatory variable in both models. The probability of planned and actual succession within the 
following five years is significantly influenced by the age of the farm operator. As the farm 
operator’s age increases, the probability of actual successions increases exponentially. 
Whereas the probability of succession for a hypothetical farm operator7 is small (below 0.1) at 
ages below 55, the probability is close to 1 once the farm operator’s age exceeds 70. Between 
55 and 70, the succession probability on average increases by 5.6 percentage points with 
every additional year. The probability of planned succession increases with age as children 
become older and more suitable for succession and parents become more prepared to make 
succession decisions. We did not find a negative age-succession relationship at higher ages as 
suggested by earlier studies on succession for different countries (e.g. Kimhi and Bollman, 
1999; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi and Nachliaeli, 2001). The spouse’s age (AGES) is 
not found to have a significant impact on succession considerations. 
We also observe that farms located in the northern parts of Finland (NORTH = 1) report a 
significantly higher probability of handing over the farm, which corresponds to earlier find-
ings of Pietola et al. (2003). However, when looking at planned farm transfers, no such dif-
ference between northern and southern regions is observed. 
Farm characteristics are expected to influence both, succession plans and actual behaviour 
because they affect the value of the farm for the potential successor. Previous studies found 
succession to be more likely in larger farms (Gasson et al., 1988; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; 
Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001; Glauben et al., 2002; Hennessy, 2002). In contrast to our expecta-
tions, hardly any of the farm and financial characteristics were found to influence signifi-
                                                 
7  A hypothetical farm (operator) is characterised by taking mean and mode values for all explanatory vari-
ables. 
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cantly actual or planned succession.8 This is particularly surprising, since our data base has 
relatively detailed information on the financial situation of the farm. Farm income (FINC), 
debt and farm property9, farm size (measured in hectares under cultivation (FIELD)) as well 
as various dummy variables characterising the production structure of farms were all found to 
have no significant explanatory power. The only exception being the positive impact of the 
dummy variable LDF for production line, which is significantly different from zero at the 
10%-level in the probit model on actual succession. The probability of actual succession is 
higher in livestock and dairy farms (LDF = 1). This lack of explanatory power of financial 
variables might be related to their high variability over time. More appropriate measures of 
the financial performance of farms could be obtained by using an average of farm income, for 
example, over a five year period prior to the period of investigation (1991 to 1996). This data 
unfortunately is not available here.  
Differences between planned and actual successions can be investigated in more detail by 
empirically analysing the variable DS. This allows us to see whether the likelihood of succes-
sion plans not to materialise is significantly related to specific characteristics of the farm and 
the farm family. Table 3 reports results from a multinomial logit model estimated on DS. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8  The endogenous variables farm income (INC), debt to asset ratio (DAR)  and farm family’s working hours 
(HOURS) were included in the analysis under the H0 hypothesis but were not found to be statistically sig-
nificant according to the t-test and do not thus cause any problem. 
 
9  Table 2 reports results for the debt to equity ratio (DAR) but we also included variables separately. 
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Table 3. Results from the multinomial- logit model on the intention–behaviour discrepancy. 
 
 
‘type-one error’ 
DS = 1 
(AS > PS) 
‘type-two error’ 
DS = 2 
(PS > AS) 
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
     
Constant  2.993 (0.51) -18.699 (-2.58) 
Farmer’s age (AGEF) -0.473 (-1.86) 0.596 (2.03) 
Farmer’s age squared (AGEF2) 0.007 (2.55) -0.005 (-1.57) 
Spouse’s age (AGES) -0.018 (-0.92) -0.013 (-0.97) 
Arable land area (LAND) 0.002 (0.21) -0.009 (-1.16) 
Farm Income (INC) -0.005 (-0.02) 0.059 (0.44) 
Livestock and dairy farm (LDF) 0.061 (0.54) 0.062 (0.12) 
North (NORTH) -0.226 (-0.27) -0.848 (-2.02) 
Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) -0.241 (-0.16) 0.589 (1.03) 
Farm family's 'working hours (HOURS ) 0.013 (0.50) -0.001 (-0.03) 
     
Log- likelihood -132.378 
Restricted log- likelihood -171.596 
Likelihood ratio test (DF) 78.436 (18) 
% Correct predictions 85.6 
% Correct predictions 0, (1), [2] 98.6, (36.4), [2.5] 
Remarks: DF refers to the degrees of freedom. Outcome DS = 0 is the comparison group. 
 
The predictive power of this model is low. Only one of those 40 farm households which 
planned succession but then did not hand over the farm was correctly classified by the model. 
From the 11 households, where succession took place although it was not planned, only four 
are correctly classified. This low predictive power most likely has to do with the fact that un-
planned behaviour is often caused by unexpected and accidental events, which are unforeseen 
and neglected in the individual farmer’s decision making and are even more difficult to take 
into account for an outside observer. In any case, the main interest of this analysis is not the 
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predictive power of the empirical model. Rather, we are concerned with the existence of a 
significant relationship between the intention–behaviour discrepancy (DS) and farm and fam-
ily characteristics.  
Table 3 suggests that the intention-behaviour discrepancy is significantly related to the farm 
operator’s age. On the basis of the parameter estimates reported, Figure 1 illustrates this rela-
tionship for a hypothetical farm operator. 
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Figure 1: The intention-behaviour discrepancy over the farm operator’s life cycle. 
Remarks: The probability of a specific event j (with j = 0, 1, 2) is computed as 
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is the vector of parameter estimates reported in Table 3. 
 
The ‘type-two error’ first increases with the farm operator’s age, reaches its maximum at age 
59 and then decreases again. For a hypothetical farm operator aged 59, the calculated prob-
ability of planned succession is about 20 percentage points larger than the calculated probabil-
No discrepancy 
Pr(DS = 0) 
‚Type-two error’ 
Pr(DS = 2) 
‚Type-one error’ 
Pr(DS = 1) 
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ity of actual succession. 10 The extent of ‘type-two errors’ decreases and ‘type-one errors’ 
substantially gain importance as the farm operator’s age further increases. The older the farm 
operator gets, the more likely an unplanned succession will take place and succession plans 
reported in farm surveys will significantly underestimate actual succession probabilities.  
A more detailed evaluation of the reasons for this discrepancy is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. Horowitz’s definition of intertemporal consistency with respect to preferences (see sec-
tion 1) requires that exogenous shocks (changes in the economic environment that could lead 
individuals to revise their plans between ‘now’ and ‘in the future’) do not occur or are ade-
quately controlled. This certainly is a problem in the current setting. In particular, the farm 
survey does not provide detailed information on the health status of the farm operator nor the 
employment opportunities of the potential farm successor, etc. But even if this information 
were to have been collected in a survey, its reliability as a predictor for future behaviour could 
be called into question in the same way as the farm operator’s succession plans. These vari-
ables might change between the time of the survey and the time of the planned succession. 
From the results reported, it seems plausible that unforeseen events, that are important for 
actual succession decisions (such as health problems of the farm operator, for example), occur 
more frequently as the farm operator’s age increases.  
Again, the regional dummy variable (NORTH) is significant in the second column. In the 
northern parts of Finland, a ‘type-two error’ is less likely. If there is a succession plan, it will 
be carried out. In the southern parts, the family members involved in succession seem to 
change their minds more often. Whether this effect is due to the stronger impact of non-farm 
factors, that might be more difficult to predict for a farmer, remains an open question though. 
                                                 
10  This calculation is based upon the parameter estimates reported in Table 2. 
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Besides the higher opportunity cost of farming, uncertainty over agricultural income policy 
programs might be higher in the South than in the North (Niemi and Ahlstedt, 2004). 
The parameter estimates of all other explanatory variables introduced (financial characteris-
tics of farms) are not statistically significant.11 
 
4. Conclusions  
This study investigates and compares farmers’ succession plans as well as their actual succes-
sion behaviour. The data set taken from the Finnish Farm Accountancy Data Network is sup-
plemented with results from annual farm surveys for 348 farms. A first comparison of succes-
sion plans and actual behaviour indicates that farm operator’s plans are realised in 85% of the 
cases. In 11% of the observations, planned successions did not take place whereas 3% of the 
farm households report unplanned successions. The econometric analysis indicates that both, 
planned and actual successions are significantly related to the farm operator’s age and to re-
gional variables. Further, we find that the intention-behaviour discrepancy is not purely acci-
dental but is significantly related to the farm operator’s age. Neither succession plans nor ac-
tual behaviour is significantly influenced by the financial situation of the farm.  
For researchers aiming at empirically investigating planned succession behaviour, our results 
offer both, good news and bad news. The good news is that the above mentioned results do 
not suggest that the realisation of farm operator’s succession plans is significantly biased by 
farm characteristics. In fact, the data set analysed here does not support any relationship be-
tween farm financial characteristics and succession behaviour, either planned or actual. The 
                                                 
11  Changes in farm charactersitcs between 1996 and 2001 also did not contribute significantly to the ex-
planatory power of the model. 
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only variable being a good predictor of succession is the farm operator’s age. And this is the 
bad news: for this variable, we find that results from farm surveys on planned succession be-
haviour produces biased results. Whereas the likelihood of planned succession is overesti-
mated significantly at younger ages, the opposite is observed once the farm operator’s age 
exceeds 65 years. 
Unfortunately, the specific reason for this discrepancy (new information, time inconsistent 
preferences, …) cannot be identified on the basis of the available information and is open for 
further research. The present contribution suggests that the relationship between the farm op-
erator’s age and his succession plans estimated on the basis of farm surveys may be mislead-
ing. Therefore, stated plans have only a negligible value in predicting the observed behaviour. 
A farm operator’s statements on the timing of succession may not provide enough informa-
tion on the grounds of designing structural policies in agriculture.  
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics of farms continuing farm accountancy system as well as 
exiting farms. 
Farms used for econometric analysis (number of farms is 348)    
 Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Farmer’s age  43.4 9.21 19.0 68.0 
Spouse’s  age  36.3 16.1 - 69.0 
Arable land, ha  41.6 26.2 7.54 191.5 
Forest, ha  79.4 74.5 0 656.0 
Share of livestock and dairy farms (%) 70.9 - 0 1.00 
Share of farms located in the North (%) 49.7 - 0 1.00 
Total assets, €10,000 18.1 11.3 2.45 79.1 
Farm depts., €10,000 6.16 6.63 0 35.8 
Farm family's working hours, 100 h 36.7 17.12 2.62 81.4 
Farm Income, €10,000 2.19 1.37  -3.09 10.1 
 Continued in the FADN (number of farms is 366) 
 Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Farmer’s age  43.8 9.48 19.0 84.0 
Spouse’s age  36.3 16.5  - 69.0 
Arable land, ha  39.8 25.1  6.30  187.0 
Forest, ha  78.7 73.5 0 656.0 
Share of livestock and dairy farms (%) 71.0  - 0 1.00 
Share of farms located in the North (%) 50.5  - 0 1.00 
Total assets, €10,000  17.8  11.2  2.40 79.1 
Farm depts., €10,000  5.90  6.60 0 35.8 
Farm family's working hours, 100 h 36.3 17.0  2.62 81.4 
Farm Income, €10,000 2.09 1.38 -3.09 10.9 
 Exited from the FADN (number of farms is 145) 
 Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Farmer’s age  43.5 10.5 25.0 68.0 
Spouse’s age  36.5 16.6  - 71.0 
Arable land, ha  33.8 17.4  6.40 130.9 
Forest, ha  81.7 102.5  1.42 1079.2 
Share of livestock and dairy farms (%) 82.1  - 0 1.00 
Share of farms located in the North (%) 64.1  - 0 1.00 
Total assets, €10,000  16.3  8.60  2.93 51.6 
Farm depts, €10,000  6.19  6.20 0  28.4 
Farm family's working hours, 100 h 37.4  16.1  3.60 84.5 
Farm Income, €10,000 2.10 2.25 -1.71  
Remarks: Statistics refer to variables in 1996. 
